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Of all the founders of the American nation, Alexander Hamilton 
remains the most enigmatic. The Hamilton name still s t i rs up deeply 
rooted emotions and lends itself to highly partisan controversies. Much of 
the disagreement revolves around an interpretation of Hamilton's economic 
program, which occasions as much dispute today as it did 175 years ago. 
By "economic program, " I mean specifically the major reports Hamilton 
submitted to Congress as the Secretary of the Treasury. The most impor-
tant provisions of these included the funding of the national debt, the 
assumption of state debts by the Federal government, the employment of 
excise taxes, the establishment of a national bank, the creation of a mint 
and a system of currency and, finally, the encouragement of diversification 
in the national economy through the use of subsidies, protective tariffs and 
bounties. Though there have been conflicting theories as to the net effect of 
these policies, there can be no doubt that they had an enormous impact on 
the social, political and economic framework of the new nation. 
Basically, the historical interpretations of these policies have taken 
three major directions, and tend to contradict each other at various points. 
The first — which we can call the "aristocratic" view — sees Hamilton's 
program as designed to protect and further the interests of the moneyed 
class at the expense of the larger democratic masses . Hamilton is pictured 
as an eighteenth century "wheeler-dealer" manipulating the finances of the 
early Republic to favor a select, privileged class. This position is most 
succinctly stated by Joseph Charles: 
From the point of view of the interest of the country as a 
whole, the axioms upon which Hamilton's program rested 
may be false, the reasoning by which it was supported, 
defective or strained; but from the point of view of the 
creation and strengthening of a moneyed interest, his 
whole plan was flawless both in conception and execution?• 
The second evaluation of Hamilton's program can be conveniently called the 
"mercantilist" view and s t resses the anachronistic nature of his ideas. His 
fiscal plan is seen as designed to keep alive a dying and outmoded economic 
system. A leading spokesman for this view is Russell Kirk who writes: 
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Indeed Hamilton was contemplating not so much the c rea-
tion of a new industrialism as the reproduction of Euro-
pean economic systems which the spirit of the age already 
was erasing . . . . [He] was a straggler behind his age 
rather than the prophet of a new day. 2 
The third view of Hamilton is in direct conflict with both of these positions 
and heralds the first Secretary of the Treasury as the voice of the new 
American nation, rising above the petty, factional and regional jealousies 
of his contemporaries. Here Hamilton is pictured not as the spokesman for 
a limited class interest, nor as the defender of an imperial policy, but 
rather as an apostle of unity and solidarity, who shaped with enormous 
foresight the economic foundations of the new nation. We might call this the 
"American" or Nationalist" view which Louis Hacker articulates in Alex-
ander Hamilton in the American Tradition: 
Hamilton concerned himself with banking for the same 
reasons that he endlessly devoted himself to the matter of 
public credit: both would make his country secure and 
prosperous. He was constantly weaving together in an 
intricate and seamless fabric public policy and private 
striving, the good of the whole community and the benefits 
accruing from enterpr ise . 3 
Each of these evaluations centers around the importance of Hamil-
ton's motives in formulating and promoting his economic policies. They are 
seen as economic power and self interest, imperial ambitions and national 
strength and security respectively, and Hamilton1 s historical reputation 
r i ses and falls accordingly. A closer look at each of these positions will 
clearly delineate the points of conflict and perhaps enable us to get a closer 
look at the "real" Alexander Hamilton. 
The aristocratic view of Hamilton emerges from the work of Claude 
Bowers, Henry Bamford Parkes and Joseph Charles. The idea gained great 
impetus from the work of Charles A. Beard who, in his Economic Origins 
of Jeffersonian Democracy, emphasizes the personal financial interests that 
motivated Hamilton's supporters. Beard analyzes the congressional divi-
sion on Hamilton's funding plan in terms of "agrarian" versus "capitalistic" 
interests.^ Bowers develops this point further (though certainly not as ana-
lytically as Beard) and concludes since most of Hamilton's circle engaged 
in speculation and reaped major benefits from the plan, its purpose must 
have been to protect and enrich the moneyed group. Not only did it benefit 
the few, says Bowers, it also exploited the many: 
The common soldier had not profited by these policies. 
The farmer and the mechanic could see no benefit to 
themselves, but among speculators, some of them mem-
bers of Congress, they observed evidence of new-found 
wealth. These men were building better houses, riding in 
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coaches where they had previously walked and there was 
an ominous rumbling and grumbling beneath the surface, 
to which the Hamiltonians were oblivious or indifferent. 
After all, this was merely the whining of the ne'er do 
wells of the taverns and the illiterates of the farms. 5 
The passage captures something of the tone of Bowers' volume which is 
hardly noted for its historical objectivity. 
Parkes emphatically agrees with BowersT judgment and frankly states 
that Hamilton's economic program meant "the use of political power to give 
economic privileges to the moneyed c l a s se s . " 6 However, Parkes is less 
suspicious of Hamilton's motives and suggests that he was simply a mis -
guided economic theorist who honestly believed that by strengthening the 
upper-class interest in government, "he was making America into an 
orderly, disciplined, hardworking, and wealthy nation. " 7 
Joseph Charles' indictment is much more severe and needs to be 
examined in more detail. Charles raises the question: Was Hamilton's 
economic program intended to "further or subvert" the new constitutional 
government?^ Noting that Hamilton's funding plan shattered the feeling of 
harmony and unity that had previously existed, Charles contradicts the idea 
of Hamilton as a staunch devotee of union and nationalism. Further, Ham-
ilton's funding and assumption plans increased the national debt and thereby 
created a greater opportunity for the moneyed class to engage in active 
speculation. Seen in this light, Charles feels their actual intent becomes 
apparent: they were the most ideal measures conceivable to concentrate the 
nation's wealth in the hands of the capitalist c lass . Charles explains Ham-
ilton's personal financial disinterestedness by suggesting that his real 
motivation was to gain power and wield influence. For this he needed the 
backing of wealthy men and wisely kept his hands clean to avoid arousing 
suspicions of personal gain. Charles presents the most formidable argu-
ment of the aristocratic position, and the above summation can hardly cap-
ture its force, but many of his points seem to me seriously weakened by 
overstatement. For example, his portrait of Washington as a pathetic, aging 
statesman, the dupe of Hamilton's shrewdness and scheming, seems to me 
a grave exaggeration of certain carefully selected details, which are calcu-
lated to convince by insinuation rather than logic. But we will look at 
Charles' argument more closely after examining the essential points of the 
other views of Hamilton. 
The "mercantilist" position is less complex and is proposed by such 
unlikely bed-fellows as Vernon Parrington and Russell Kirk. Parrington, a 
decidedly "liberal" historian, enveighs against Hamilton's anti-democratic 
views and sees him as a cold and practical imperialist, with little or no 
concern for the social consequences of his policies. Hamilton's desire for 
national solidarity and his capitalistic economics are explained as tenden-
cies "congenial to his imperialistic mind ." 1 0 Parrington's Hamilton is a 
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Machiavellian prince, awed by the concept of the leviathan state and willing 
to employ any measures to achieve it. He is a shrewd calculator who "con-
templated with satisfaction the increase in wealth that would accrue from 
buying toll in the weak and helpless. n 1 1 The British system was congenial 
to him, because he saw in it the prospects for building an American empire. 
Russell Kirk seems intent upon writing Hamilton out of the conserva-
tive tradition. For him, Hamilton was a political and economic blunderer, 
far behind the tenor of his age. Kirk feels that Hamilton thought in terms of 
the seventeenth century and based his ideas about economics on the m e r -
cantilistic "balance of trade" system. 12 
Though neither Kirk nor Parrington devotes much attention to a close 
examination of Hamilton's economic program, both agree that the policies 
of British imperialism shaped his thinking and directed his financial plans. 
Thus ironically disinherited by major liberal and conservative historians, 
Hamilton emerges from the mercantilist position as a man without a coun-
try, drifting in a limbo of historical posterity. 
Joseph DorfmanTs evaluation of Hamilton's program fits somewhere 
between the mercantilist and nationalist views. Dorfman calls Hamilton a 
"traditionalist" who favored an "aristocracy of wealth and learning and had 
a great respect for the accumulation of money, both by the individual and 
the nation, as the source of power and prosperi ty."1^ Mutual interaction 
between government and business emerges for Dorfman as the key to Ham-
iltonian economic policy. The plan was "grand and imperial in scope."1"* 
But Dorfman1 s verdict is more favorable than Kirk's or Parrington's. With 
R. G. Tugwell he specifically refutes the aristocratic position and calls 
Hamilton a "nation-maker, " whose loyalty to his country "was genuinely 
national and not a class loyalty. He was looking for strength for his nation 
and he took it where he could find it. " 1 5 
The "nationalist" view is the most difficult to present in summary 
fashion. It seems the most widely held opinion of Hamilton's program and 
is presented in great detail by most of his biographers. Among i ts adher-
ents, though they differ on various points, are Louis Hacker, John C. Miller, 
Clinton Rossiter, and the author of the most recent definitive biography of 
Hamilton, Broadus Mitchell. An extreme statement of this view is offered 
by Henry Cabot Lodge in his now dated biography of Hamilton: 
Hamilton was striving for a vigorous national life, and his 
chief object was to impart to the central government the 
greatest possible strength. He armed the government 
with credit and with a productive revenue; he won for it a 
potent ally in the national bank; by the funding system and 
the bank he drew out and welded together with the strong 
influence of pecuniary interest, a powerful class, which 
knew no state lines; and by his protective policy and 
internal improvements he aimed to create yet another 
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vigorous body of supporters, and give the government still 
more strength and popularity. It was a great policy, the 
work of a master mind looking far into the future. It was 
the foundation of a great party, and the cornerstone from 
which the federal government was built. 16 
Although most of the other nationalists sound less like the Republican party 
platform, they would agree with Lodge's central points. 
Louis Hacker takes specific issue with those who suggest Hamilton's 
policies were designed to further the interests of one class, and those who 
see his program as backward rather than forward looking. The former can-
not accept the fact that "a secure government and a progressive economy 
a re linked at a hundred and one different places by fiscal policy. "1? The 
latter emphasize a very small aspect of Hamilton's economic ideas and one 
that was congenial to his earlier years, and not a part of his mature poli-
cies. Hacker notes that the "mercantilist" group often point to his words in 
The Continentalist18 rather than to his opinions in the later reports . Quot-
ing the later Hamilton, Hacker suggests that 
He is no mercantilist with an erroneous understanding of 
the roles of gold and silver; in fact he talks in straight-
forward Smithian terms: " . . . the intrinsic wealth of a 
nation is to be measured not by the abundance of the p re -
cious metals contained in it, but by the quantity of the 
productions of its labor and industry . . . ."19 
Hacker suggests that Hamilton turned to protectionism in his Report on 
Manufactures only as a last resort , so that the United States would be able 
to compete on equal terms in the world market. The essential Hamilton, he 
notes, was a libertarian and favored a mutually beneficial intercourse 
between nations, rather than one devoted to the "vain project of selling 
everything and buying nothing. "^u 
In both The Federalist Era and Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Pa r -
adox, John C. Miller depicts Hamilton as a vigorous, creative statesman 
whose economic policies enabled America to achieve national union and 
economic security within a decade of the framing of the Constitution. By 
1792 the Hamiltonian program had accomplished eight major objectives. 
Miller sees these as: (1) machinery had been established to begin liquida-
tion of the national debt; (2) the fluctuating price of government securities 
had been normalized and made more secure; (3) dead and hoarded capital 
was re-invested in government; (4) a national system of currency was c r e -
ated; (5) a system for the handling of future debts had been inaugurated; (6) 
the supremacy of the federal government had been established; (7) United 
States government credit had been demonstrated in international circles, 
and foreign investments were made secure; (8) the "embryo" of a modern 
industrial society had been formulated.21 Miller argues that Hamilton used 
the national debt as "a sword with which to vanquish the s t a t e s " ^ and 
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asser t the dominant authority of the central government. It was a bold, 
imaginative plan of a master statesman. 
Broadus Mitchell takes a similar position in Heritage from Hamilton 
and Alexander Hamilton: The National Adventure. Addressing the mercan-
tilist position, Mitchell calls Hamilton's favorable attitude toward Britain 
"inevitable" for there was little to be gained by continuing the animosity 
between the two nations. England was a model of "material success, " and 
the new Republic would benefit much more from friendly relations.^3 A 
close analysis of Mitchell's detailed account of Hamilton's economic p ro -
gram is beyond the scope of this paper, but particularly relevant is his 
repudiation of the issues raised by Joseph Charles. With Charles specifi-
cally in mind, Mitchell writes: 
A recent wr i te r . . . queries "whether. . . the measures 
of his economic program . . . were intended to further or 
subvert the type of government which most well informed 
men thought they were supporting when they voted to 
accept the Constitution." . . . where is the mystery? 
Hamilton's proposals presented to Congress, most con-
spicuously those in 1790-1791, were necessarily both 
political and fiscal, for the enactments he recommended 
would determine the character, because the condition 
[sic], of the nation at the outset. It is difficult to know 
what most well informed men thought they were support-
ing in the Constitution, but on the face of it they wanted a 
replacement for the Confederation with its lack of cohe-
sion and incapacity to command ways and means to con-
duct a government. The first session of Congress, except 
for an emergency import measure, virtually turned to the 
Secretary of the Treasury for instruments to make the 
Constitution a reality. ^4 
Mitchell also argues that Hamilton is not to be rebuked because he had a 
"ready-made majority in Congress."^5 He was concerned with restoring 
the public credit, and this his plan accomplished. Mitchell's Hamilton is a 
careful administrator who emphasized administration in an age when theory 
and abstraction were in vogue. Hamilton dealt practically with real finan-
cial problems, and was the first national planner in our history; he thought 
of the economy in terms of the public good, and not in the interest of any 
particular faction. 
Though Clinton Rossiter 's work on Hamilton is a study of his impor-
tance in forming the Constitution, it s t resses the importance of the eco-
nomic program even in this area. Several elements of the program 
reflected a constitutional argument between Hamilton and his opposition, 
and in each instance, says Rossiter, history has supported Hamilton's idea 
of broad interpretation. His proposal that the federal government assume 
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the states ' debts "struck almost casually a stout blow for the broad, nation-
alistic, consolidating view of the Constitution. "26 The bank report led 
directly to his formulation of the "implied powers" doctrine of constitutional 
interpretation, which received judicial sanction from Justice Marshall in 
the celebrated McCullough vs. Maryland decision. And in the Report on 
Manufactures, Hamilton assumed the national government's power to st im-
ulate industrial development through the use of bounties, protective tariffs 
and subsidies. His constitutional ground was the "general welfare" clause 
and this eventually broadened even further the powers of Congress to legis-
late in areas not specifically provided for in the Constitution. 
Nathan Schachner and F. S. Oliver also present Hamilton as a nation-
alist. They see national strength and unity as the key to his policies. Oliver 
particularly feels that Hamilton was dissatisfied with the solidarity of the 
union as it existed under the Constitution, and attempted to eliminate cer-
tain deficiencies by his financial measures . 2 7 Ironically, in a negative way, 
this would seem to support somewhat the contentions of Joseph Charles. 
One unorthodox view of Hamilton is worth mentioning. Curtis Nettels 
in The Emergence of a National Economy presents Hamilton as merely the 
executor of Washington's policies and suggests that the Hamiltonian eco-
nomic program would be better called the Federalist p rog ram. 2 8 This 
devaluation of Hamilton's role is difficult to understand in light of some 
very basic facts. When Washington queried the members of his cabinet 
regarding the constitutionality of a national bank, it was Hamilton's position 
which was accepted and only later became the Federalist position. It was 
Hamilton's activities that worked out the details of the famous "assumption" 
compromise, trading the location of the national capital for the assumption 
of state debts. And The Report on Manufactures is clearly a Hamiltonian 
document, hardly inspired or promoted by Washington at all. I might also 
mention that Nettels is squarely at odds with Charles on this point, but it 
seems hardly fair to refute one argument with another that I have taken 
issue with. I would suggest that neither Charles nor Nettels offers enough 
evidence to support their radical departure from traditional positions. It 
seems likely that Hamilton was neither Washington's master nor his puppet, 
but rather that both worked toward shaping the direction of the "Federalist 
Era. " 
Faced with these conflicting views, the student of Hamilton's program 
must ask which comes closest to capturing the tenor of his thought? Which 
has best estimated the true intent and effect of his economic program? 
Have the "aristocratic" historians truly demonstrated that Hamilton was the 
protector of a limited class interest? Have the "mercantilists" shown that 
his policies were an attempt to revive the British system on American soil? 
Or have the "nationalists" succeeded in proving that he was a national 
statesman, the guardian of the public good? 
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The main problem with the "aristocratic" position is that it develops 
its points by insinuation rather than logic, and ra i ses what seem to me 
artificial questions concerning Hamilton's program. When Joseph Charles, 
for example, asks whether it was intended to "further or subvert" the new 
government, his words seem calculated to hint at sinister motives. May we 
not ask instead whether the program meant to "strengthen or weaken" the 
federal government, in which case the answer becomes more apparent. 
Further, I fail to see how the assumption of state debts, which is the point 
Hamilton argued most intensely for, furthered the interest of the moneyed 
class. The whole point of assumption was not to increase the amount owed 
to state creditors, but rather to transfer the source of their income from 
the states to the federal government, thereby enforcing the supremacy of 
the latter. Charles also makes much of Hamilton's insistence that the 
domestic debt be paid to current holders rather than discriminating between 
current and original holders as Madison suggested. Discrimination was a 
tenable plan according to Charles, because some of the states, Pennsylvania 
for example, "knew that it was not impossible to work out an equitable plan of 
discrimination between original and present holders, because they had done 
so with their own state debt. "29 Charles does not take into account an 
essential difference between the state and national debts. Discrimination 
might be possible within an individual state because of the generally uni-
form nature of the certificates issued; on a national level, however, the 
diverse kinds of bonds, stocks, certificates and other paper holdings made 
a plan based on discrimination quite unrealistic. Further, Charles ignores 
the very basic fact that the original holders were as much engaged in spec-
ulation as the current holders. As Jacob Cooke puts it: 
The charge continues to be made . . . that Hamilton's 
report allowed speculators to reap large and unfair prof-
its on the securities they had bought up from poor sol-
diers and Southern backwoodsmen. Its repetition is cur i -
ous in view of the obvious fact that those who parted with 
their securities . . . were also speculators. 30 
Why should we think of the bears as less self-interested and more virtuous 
than the bulls as Charles suggests ? 
To call the "mercantilist" position into question, all we need do is 
read closely the Report on Manufactures. We are so used to thinking of it 
as a bible of protectionism that we miss its central point which is diversi-
fication of the national economy. Protectionism, for Hamilton, is a means 
to achieve this and not an end. The Report on Manufactures is neither a 
tract against agriculture nor a polemic for manufacturing. Rather it is a 
document which looks forward to an America of varied economic interests . 
When Vernon Parrington accuses Hamilton of "buying toll in the weak and 
helpless, " he is probably referring to the section of the report which p ro -
motes child labor. What Parrington and others fail to realize is that child 
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labor in the eighteenth century was not looked upon with the same disfavor 
that we look upon it today. It was considered a normal, in fact, useful way 
of keeping children occupied. To accuse Hamilton of inhumanity on these 
grounds is to be guilty of historical presentism. In almost every other way 
the Report on Manufactures is a document far ahead of its time, and how 
anyone can accuse Hamilton of tTbackwardness" in light of this report is dif-
ficult to understand. 
In all, the "nationalist" view seems the most satisfactory interpreta-
tion of Hamilton's program. It is interesting to note that all the book length 
studies of Hamilton's career take the nationalist posi t ion.3 1 This may 
reflect biographical prejudice, but it may also suggest that the more one 
examines the effects of Hamilton's program the more he realizes how far-
reaching that program was. Perhaps some of the nationalists overstate 
their case, and perhaps" Hamilton was not quite as saintly as they would 
have him appear. Nonetheless, they have succeeded in showing that Hamil-
ton's interests were much broader than those suggested by the "ar is to-
cra ts" and "mercant i l is ts ." They have examined Hamilton's program in 
terms of results and found those results to be favorable to the nation as a 
whole. They have reminded us that repeated cliches casting suspicions on 
Hamilton's motives are products of a one-sided view of Hamilton that has 
come down to us from Jefferson through John Taylor of Caroline to Claude 
Bowers and Joseph Charles. The results of Hamilton's economic program 
were complex and widespread, and cannot be summed up in neat little 
phrases. As Broadus Mitchell tells us: 
Estimate of these results, serviceable and less so, may 
not be meaningfully given in a sentence, but must emerge 
in the lively history which is the business of this vol-
ume. 32 
The nationalists ask us to approach Hamilton with an open mind, which 
indeed, is the first law of historical investigation. 
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